ABSTRACT In recent years, intelligent railway operation and maintenance using cloud technology have received wide consideration for the provision of public transport services. Under the cloud environment, information security is critical to ensure the integrity of data through protection from unauthorized manipulation and the confidentiality through protection against the leakage of sensitive information. This paper proposes a lightweight authenticated encryption scheme with associated data based on a novel discrete chaotic S-box coupled map lattice (SCML), which avoids the dynamic degradation of the digital chaotic system and low efficiency of the chaos-based cryptosystem. Based on the chaotic SCML, an authenticated encryption scheme that protects the confidentiality and integrity in one pass is presented in detail. The security analysis and performance simulations in software and hardware show that the proposed scheme is efficient and provides adequate security through authentication and encryption. Such a scheme could be used for applications in a railway cloud service that requires moderate security and low-cost implementations.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of information technology, the use of cloud computing has increased dramatically, and it has become ubiquitous in industry, commerce, and administration. Along with that, there is a need for a security architecture over the user's credentials so that no unauthorized user can access the cloud [1] - [3] . In the railway field, intelligent railway operation and maintenance based on the cloud platform have attracted attention as a way to provide an efficient, unified, safe and automated public transport service, as shown in Fig. 1 . The railway applications such as [4] and [5] supported by cloud computing are based on the resources from an integrated data center, which collects massive railway infrastructure data through the dedicated mobile-IoT-cloud-network in real-time. As a result, there is a growing demand for an efficient and secure IoT network to protect the data stream. In the IoT-cloud-based intelligent railway, data are inseparable with automated operation and maintenance; therefore, the integrity that protects the data from unauthorized manipulation and the confidentiality that prevents leakage of sensitive information is critical to the networks. Thus, the encryption algorithms and the message authentication codes are widely used together, following MtE, EtM, and M&E schemes [6] , to protect confidentiality and integrity in data transmission. In terms of cost, since the system needs to address massive data in real-time under the resource-limited IoT-cloud network [7] , the authenticated encryption (AE) scheme was proposed to provide both confidentiality and integrity protection, which is more secure than a block cipher and avoids an increase in computational cost. Although most techniques used in these systems are still traditional cryptography-based approaches, alternative approaches that can meet the increasing security requirements are highly desirable for governments and the research community.
In the last decades, chaotic cryptography has received considerable attention in various security applications due to the ergodicity, parameter sensitivity, deterministic dynamics, and structural complexity of the chaotic map, which correspond to the confusion, diffusion, pseudo-random and attack complexity of a cryptosystem, respectively [8] . In this sense, various chaotic cryptographic schemes [9] - [13] have been developed since Matthews introduced the first chaos-based encryption scheme in 1989 [14] . In 2012, Hussain et al. suggested a chaotic S-Box as the cryptography component to provide confusion in a cryptosystem [15] . In 2013, a fast and efficient chaos-based key-hash function [16] was proposed to protect data integrity. In 2014, Faraoun [9] published a fast authenticated encryption scheme based on reversible cellular automata to provide both confidentiality and integrity protection in one pass. A parallel pseudo-random bit generator based on a symmetric coupled chaotic map lattice was proposed by Liang et al. [17] to protect confidentiality efficiently.
However, the computational cost of chaotic cryptography is quite high compared with classic symmetric cryptosystems, due to the iterative variation in the chaotic system. In addition, given that chaos is a natural phenomenon with an infinite domain, the dynamic degradation caused by chaotic system digitization, which leads to periodic behavior, is not conducive to support an adequate key space [18] . These approaches process data repeatedly, which causes latencies and increases the computational cost, especially in the resource-limited systems.
In this work, a lightweight authenticated encryption scheme with associated data for railway IoT-cloud service based on a discrete chaotic coupled map lattice, has been proposed to surmount the high computational cost of the chaosbased cryptosystem and to avoid the dynamical degradation caused by finite precision of digital implementation. This new scheme generates the keystream and authentication tag in one pass, which provides both confidentiality and integrity simultaneously. In addition, the S-Box coupled map lattice (SCML), which is easily adapted based on the balance of efficiency and security, is introduced to iteratively update the internal state. In other words, although the secret keys are the same, the keystream and tags are different when different initial vectors, associated data, or plain-texts are encrypted, so that the system can effectively resist the known plain-text attack (KPA) and chosen plain-text attack (CPA). The chaotic AE scheme is convenient to implement through hardware thanks to the parallel structure of the discrete SCML, which is another novel design feature of the scheme. Through these features higher security and efficiency can be achieved.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. S-BOX COUPLED MAP LATTICE (SCML)
The digital chaotic system is the projection of chaos in an infinite domain, which suffers from dynamical degradation. The S-Box coupled map lattice (SCML) is a discrete dynamical system that is composed of a finite array of N identical objects, called a discretized coupled map lattice, each of which can assume a state s ∈ [0, 255], and the state is updated synchronously in discrete time steps according to a local nonlinear transition function. The updated state of a coupled map lattice (CML) depends on a discrete chaotic map, such as the discretized tent map [19] , which has higher operational efficiency and is more convenient for hardware implementation than the classic tent map.
The classic one-dimensional CML [20] is defined as follows:
n indicates the state of the i-th lattice at the time index n, f (·) is the local nonlinear map and γ i (with i = 1, 2) is the coupling coefficient.
A static chaotic S-Box is introduced to replace the chaosbased map as the local nonlinear transition in chaotic CML, which reduces hardware costs by removing the floating-point arithmetic module.
Definition 1: The S-Box coupled map lattice (SCML) in this paper is described as follows:
where X i n denotes the i-th bit of the discretized state at the time index n, S(·) represents the S-Box map, which are introduced for illustration convenience (a dynamic S-Box provides better security while it reduces the efficiency, which means the balance should be considered as appropriate), as the local transform function, , ⊕ , denote the bit-wise arithmetic left-shift, XOR, and modular addition operations, respectively, and ζ denotes the shift bit(s) as the parameter of the SCML.
B. DISCRETE CHAOTIC CHARACTERISTIC OF SCML
The Lyapunov exponent is one of the major criteria that indicates the chaos characteristics of a chaotic map. The discrete Lyapunov exponent [21] is defined as Eq. (3), that is assessed to evaluate the chaotic property of the discrete chaos-based system.
Eq. (3) 
Eq. (4) indicates the confusion capacity of the SCML, where s is the number of lattice sites, N is the iteration round of the SCML, and
} is the SCML map with the parameter ζ . X n represents the data set of SCML at the n-th iteration, i.e., {x 1 n , x 2 n , · · · , x s n }. R n is the neighboring set of X n which is chosen subjectively, i.e., {x 1 n , x 2 n , · · · , x s n ⊕ 1}. A test is performed to evaluate the impact of ζ (in Eq. (2)) on the maximum DLE. Four groups of neighboring pairs with 32 lattice sites, which are randomly chosen, are iterated with SCML 20000 times. The result of this evaluation is shown in Fig. 2 . It illustrates that SCML possesses the best discrete chaotic characteristic when ζ is fixed at 0.
For further analysis, the distribution of maximum DLEs is examined for 10000 samples with ζ fixed at 0. Each sample is iterated for 5000 rounds with randomly initialized lattices. The results are shown in Fig. 3 . According to the results, the maximum discrete Lyapunov exponents are concentrated at approximately 2.25, which indicates that the discretized chaotic characteristic of SCML is stable in the sense of DLE.
C. RANDOMNESS OF THE SCML
The SCML synchronously provides confusion through the local nonlinear transformation function and diffusion through the iterative updating scheme. The ergodicity of SCML provides randomness, which is essential as the cryptography component.
The correlation coefficient is tested by a random sequence of 128 bits, which is iterated for fifty thousand times. Due to the identical properties of each lattice site, the same correlations are observed for all lattice sites; the results are shown in Fig. 4 . Fig . 5 shows the distribution density of the SCML. The data stream with 1000 samples, each of which is generated by iterating a randomly chosen initial sequence 1000 times. The distribution of the data stream approaches a constant value, which indicates that SCML obeys the uniform distribution. 
III. PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this section, we introduce the SCML as a chaotic cryptography component to generate the keystream iteratively, and to design a discrete chaotic authenticated encryption scheme. The overall architecture of the proposed cryptosystem is shown in Fig. 6 . First, the internal state is initialized with the key and IV. Then, the associated data are processed optionally. Finally, the cipher-text and authentication tag are generated with plain-text through an iterative internal state update. When deciphering, the same key and IV are used to reconstruct the original plain-text, while no modification is made to the cipher-text; otherwise, a special symbol ⊥ is used to indicate that the cipher-text is invalid. Table 1 lists the block size of each parameter as below; those with insufficient bit length are padded to reach the minimum bit length. 
A. KEYSTREAM ITERATION WITH THE SCML
The SCML is the core component of the cryptosystem, which is in the form of 32 identical lattice sites, each containing 8 bits, and iteratively updates internal state. The SCML component is coupled with the input data to iteratively update the internal state 17 times. Then, it outputs the keystream for masking encryption or decryption. The entire process is demonstrated in Fig. 7 ; the content enclosed by the dotted line shows the iteration process of the internal state as the SCML entity. Fig. 7 shows that the odd sites of the internal state are coupled with the input data by a bit-wise XOR operation before the iteration to generate the keystream for encryption or decryption, which is described as Eq. (5). At the same time, the input data are coupled with the even sites by a bitwise XOR operation for further authentication; this is called injection, which is shown in Eq. (6) .
In Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), IS n denotes the internal state at time index n; IS n represents the injected IS n , which is coupled with Input, where Input and Output represent the input and output data blocks, which are divided into 16 byte-type lattices for each block, respectively; and || n i=m (·) denotes concatenation from site m to n. Eqs. (2), (5) and (6) are used to formulate the following notion. Definition 3: The internal state update for n round(s) is mapped in Eq. (7), where Output functions only during the encryption or decryption phrase.
B. THE DESIGN OF THE AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION SCHEME
1) INITIALIZATION
Key is used as the initial internal state IS −2 during the initialization phase of the cryptosystem. Then two rounds of SCML updating are performed with IV as the feedback to complete the initialization process. An algorithmic description of the process is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Initialization
Require: Key, IV Ensure: The encryption and decryption approaches are rather similar to associated data phase described in Algorithm 2. During the encryption and decryption phases, the keystream generated by internal state updating by SCML is masked with m i or c i for encryption or decryption, respectively. The explicit encryption process is presented in Algorithm 3 and the decryption flow is introduced in Algorithm 4, where m denotes the maximum block index and Out(·) is defined in Eq. (5).
Algorithm 3 Encryption
Require: M i Ensure: IS a+m , {C i | i ∈ [1, m]} for i ∈ [1, m] do (IS a+i , C i ) = U (IS a+i−1 , M i ) end for Algorithm 4 Decryption Require: C i Ensure: IS a+m , {M i | i ∈ [1, m]} M 1 = Out(IS a , C 1 ) for i ∈ [2, m] do (IS a+i , out i ) = U (IS a+i−1 , M i−1 ) M i = out i ⊕ C i end for
4) AUTHENTICATION AND VERIFICATION
This scheme generates a tag for authentication or verification after encryption or decryption has been completed, respectively. The approach is shown in Algorithm 5, where Key x∼y denotes the subsequence from lattice site x to y, and τ denotes the tag length in bits. When the decryption has been completed, verification tag T is generated for comparison with authentication tag T , which is calculated after encryption process. The cryptosystem will output the deciphered message only if T = T ; otherwise, the invalid symbol ⊥ is returned.
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Algorithm 5 Tag Require: Key, τ Ensure: 
IV. HARDWARE SIMULATION
Thanks to the parallel structure of SCML, the data throughput of this cryptosystem can be further enhanced by hardware implementation. This section introduces an on-line authenticated encryption system based on hardware implementation, which is designed and simulated through VHDL.
A. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCML COMPONENT
According to Sec. III-A, the internal state is updated through 17 iterations of the SCML. We introduce an internal counter to provide a control signal for the collaboration of the cryptosystem. The bit widths of pins IN and OUT (shown in Table 2 ) correspond to the internal state of this cryptosystem, which is divided into 32 registers, each of which holds 8 bits wide.
The design of the hardware SCML cryptography component is given in Fig. 8 , which is driven by a clock signal from input pin CLK. Input pin RST controls the reset action of the internal counter module that is triggered by the high-level signal. The S module is the digital mapping circuit, which has been discussed in Sec. II-A. The Counter module controls the internal update cycle of the SCML. The RDY is activated to a high-level state at every 17th iteration and is reset at the next clock.
B. ON-LINE AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
The hardware on-line authenticated encryption system is designed as shown in Fig. 9 , and the details of the pins are listed in Table 3 .
In Table 3 , the Status pin instructs the Controller component in Fig. 9 , where all the specified commands are enumerated in Table 4 . IN and OUT denote the input and output block pins, respectively. RDY_IN and RDY_OUT are the auxiliary triggers that are designed to collaborate with the external circuitry. RST pin should be activated only before the encryption and decryption processes for initialization.
As Table 4 shows, there are 6 working statuses in online authenticated encryption system. AD i denotes the i-th associated data block; M i and C i denote the i-th plain and cipher block, respectively. Key [255:128] represents the first half of Key, which participates in generating authentication tag T .
The IO rules of the controller listed in Table 5 , describe the core actions in each working status in Table 4 . According to Algorithm 1, when Status is '001', which is from high level to low level, the system treats IV as the feedback to initialize the internal state register; when Status is '010', AD is treated as the feedback to update the internal state; when Status is '011' or '100', the system loads plain-text M or cipher-text C as feedback, to output cipher-text C or deciphered-text M , respectively; when Status is '101', system updates the internal state with the key as the feedback, to generate T at the 18th clock period.
The essential internal control signals are listed in Table 6 , where INIT and SCML_CLK are not packaged into circuit pins, but used as internal triggers. The INIT signal triggers the initialization process of the internal state when it is on a high level; the SCML_CLK signal is the clock cycle of the SCML component, which is triggered by CLK through the NOT gate, to eliminate the competition and risk of digital circuits.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The following requirements should be satisfied to use this authenticated encryption scheme securely.
1) Each Key should be uniformly chosen randomly.
2) Each Key and IV pair should not be used to protect more than one message, and each Key and IV pair should not be used with two different tag sizes. 3) If verification fails, the decrypted plain-text and incorrect authentication tag should not be given as output.
A. THE ITERATION OF THE SCML
The differential should be fully diffused while updating the internal state. This paper only analyzes one local lattice of the SCML due to its annular structure and bidirectional coupling behavior.
Claim 1: The differential of any local lattice is fully diffused after 16 rounds of self-iteration.
Proof: The state of the i-th local lattice at round n is diffusing to neighboring lattice sites at round n + 1, which is defined in Eq. (2). The differential path is expressed as Eq. (8) .
Then, the differential range Rt can be derived as Eq. (9), where t is the number of SCML iterations in the internal state update process:
The internal state of this scheme is divided into 32 local lattices, which can be fully diffused for any local lattice after 16 rounds of iteration.
B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Statistical tests could detect the certain weaknesses of a sequence, which indicates the randomness of the generated key stream. Two numerical experiments are performed in this subsection to evaluate the cryptographic randomness of the SCML. The first one is an empirical randomness test that uses the NIST SP 800-22 Statistical Test Suite, which is often used for randomness testing in cryptography. We establish a test sample that consists of 100 binary sequences generated by the SCML with randomly initialized key and IV. In the tests, each sequence has a length of 32M bits and the obtained VOLUME 6, 2018 p-values are listed in Table 7 . All the p-values are greater than α (α = 0.01 is the significance level, a sequence passes a test whenever α ≥ 0.01, otherwise fails). These results show that the SCML passed all NIST SP 800-22 randomness tests.
In Table 7 , the x values in the random excursion test and the random excursion variant test indicate the non-zero state value for each cycle and the value is used to compute the frequency of each x within each cycle.
Another statistical analysis is the avalanche criterion, which evaluates the diffusion and confusion characteristics of the internal state. The result shows that the state update satisfies the strict avalanche criterion.
Definition 4: For any internal state IS n ∈ (GF(2)) 256 at time index n in the SCML, there exists a minimum differential {δ = 2 k |k = 0, 1, . . . , 255} and IS n , where IS n = IS n ⊕ δ. The result of iterating the SCML with initial states IS n and IS n for t rounds are IS n+t and IS n+t , respectively. Let t = IS n+t ⊕ IS n+t .
Combined with the proposed scheme, the experiments are performed to test the sensitivity of the internal state FIGURE 10. The connection between internal states IS and IV , Key , and Plain M, which is shown by the expectation of t , with respect to the iteration round t . The first experiment uses 20000 randomly generated IV and δ pairs as variables and randomly generated Key and M as pairs of constants, to evaluate the expectation of t . The other two experiments are identical, except the variables and constants are switched. to Key, IV , and Plain; the results are shown in Fig. 10 . Approximately 50% of the bits of the internal state are altered after t = 16, which indicates that the internal state is extremely sensitive to IV , Key and M , i.e., the avalanche effect. The result shows that the proposed scheme provides good confusion and diffusion properties after 16 iterations; that is, the internal state updating process is considered stochastic. Leaving an assurance margin, we choose t = 17 as the number of iterations in the SCML.
C. KEY SPACE
A large key space is required for any cryptosystem to resist the brute-force attack. Currently, a key space of at least 2 100 possible secret keys is expected to guarantee the resistance of brute-force attack [8] .
According to Table 8 , the key space of the proposed scheme is sufficient to resist brute-force attack, and even outperform the schemes in [9] and [11] .
D. KEY SENSITIVITY
The proposed scheme is extremely sensitive to Key and IV , which means that even a minor difference in Key or IV results in decryption invalid. To test the degree of key sensitivity, a minimum differential is injected into a key to compare with the resulting encrypted image with that obtained using the original key, as shown in Fig. 11 . Fig. 11 illustrates that the confidentiality protection of the Lena image data with the proposed scheme. Fig. 11(b) shows the cipher-text of the Lena figure; Fig. 11(c) demonstrates the avalanche criterion of the scheme, where the minimal differential results in huge differences in the cipher-text; Fig. 11(d) shows that a difference in the cipher-text affects the internal state of the decryption process, which eventually leads to authentication failure. Comparing Fig. 11(e) and Fig. 11(f) , the statistical information of the original plain-text Q. Zheng et al.: Lightweight AE Scheme Based on Chaotic SCML for Railway Cloud Service FIGURE 11. Let M be the original Lena figure, which is shown in (a). M is encrypted by the proposed scheme with randomly generated key K and IV = 0; the result C is shown in (b). Let K ⊕ K = 1. Then, encrypt M with K and IV to get the encrypted image C ; note that C = C ⊕ C , as shown in (c). Lastly, alter the first bit of C to obtain C and decrypt C with K and IV ; the result M is shown in (d). Theoretically, M should not be returned due to the invalid authenticated tag. (e) and (f) are histograms of (a) and (b), respectively.
is completely hidden through the authenticated encryption process.
E. DIFFERENTIAL AND LINEAR ANALYSIS
Kanda et al. [22] have proposed a way to analyze the differential and linear characteristic probabilities, that can be used to discuss the affiliation with an iteration of the SCML.
Lemma 1: The number of activated S-Boxes n = R t of the SCML is related to the iteration number t.
Definition 5: [22] Let n d and n l denote the minimum numbers of activated S-Boxes in a round function for DP and LP, respectively. Then, the probabilities of DCP max and LCP max are
where DP S and LP S are the differential and linear probabilities of S-Box. According to DP S and LP S of the third S-Box given in [15] , DCP max and LCP max for one update process containing 16 iterations and 33 activated S-Boxes, are less than 2 −198 and 2 −132 , respectively.
F. THE SECURITY OF THE INITIALIZATION
Differences in IV will eventually diffuse into the ciphertexts and authentication tags, thus, it is possible to apply a differential attack against the proposed scheme, which is a major threat to the security of the initialization process.
Following the initialization process, the difference spreads through 69 activated S-Boxes; however, according to Sec. III-B.1 and Sec. V-A, DCP max of the initialization is less than 2 −414 . This result indicates that differential attack is difficult.
G. THE SECURITY OF AUTHENTICATION TAG
There are two main attacks on authentication tag as follows: one is to recover the secret key or state; another is to introduce/detect an internal state collision.
There are two main attacks on authentication tag: recovering the internal state and finding the internal state collision. Furthermore, the sensitivity of authentication tag is analyzed to indicate the proposed scheme is secure.
1) RECOVERING THE KEY OR STATE
By attacking the tag without IV reuse, the internal state of SCML cannot be recovered easier than exhaustive search is expected. Assume that an attacker can inject differences into the internal state during the verification process and obtain the decrypted plain-text if the forgery attack is allowed to be repeated with the identical key and IV pair. The probability that the forgery attack succeeded is 2 −τ , thus, a tag bit length of τ ≥ 128 is recommended.
2) INTERNAL STATE COLLISION
With 2 n/2 chosen plain-texts based on the birthday attack, an internal state collision is expected to be detected after the identical Key and IV pair is used to generate the authentication tags, where n denotes the tag size in bits [23] . The proposed scheme is immune to such an attack if IV is not reused. Another way to introduce internal collision is through differential cryptanalysis. Assume that difference cancellation in the internal state happens with probability 2 −a . Then, an internal collision can be detected after identical Key and IV pair is initialized to generate the tags of 2 a message pairs. The resulting internal collision can be used to forge the tags of new plain-text. Since the internal state space large, such an attack is difficult.
3) TAG SENSITIVITY
The tag should be sensitive to differences in the plaintext. The avalanche effect degree is measured to evaluate the diffusion property of the AE tag. For convenience of VOLUME 6, 2018 description, we define {x i ∈ (GF(2)) n |i = 1, 2, . . . , n} as the sequence obtained by changing the i-th bit of x(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∈ (GF (2)) n . For the AE tag generating function F : (GF(2)) n → (GF (2)) m , where n represents the bit length of the input and m is the number of output bits; the output sequence pair of {x, x i } is denoted as {F(x), F(x i )}; (F(x i )) j is the j-th bit of F(x i ). W H (x) denotes the Hamming weight of x that is the amount of non-zero bits of x. For {x, x i } pair, let a ij be the number of differences of {F(x), F(x i )} in j-th bit and it is defined as follows:
Let b ij to be the number of {x, x i } pairs that the differences of {F(x), F(x i )} is j in bits; b ij is defined as follows:
Assuming that X is a collection of the random subsets of (GF(2) n ), and #X denotes the size of X , the avalanche and diffusion performances of F(·) are tested through following definitions: 4 denote the avalanche effect level of F(·), the completeness level of F(·), another avalanche effect level of F(·) and the strict avalanche criterion evaluation of F(·), respectively. If F(·) has good avalanche effect level and completeness level, and it satisfies the strict avalanche criterion, the values of 4 will meet the criterion as follows [24] :
The diffusion property of the AE tag is estimated by 10000 tests, each of which is performed following Eqs. (13-16) ; each test produces a 128-bit AE tag with a 128-bit randomly chosen message block, as shown in Fig. 12 (17), which confirms the result in Fig. 10 . When t = 17, the actual test results are: d 1 = 64.00097, d 2 = 1, d 3 = 0.99933, d4 = 0.99994, which indicates that the message authentication tag has a good diffusion property. In other words, the AE tag sensitivity of the proposed scheme is dependable.
H. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 1) SOFTWARE PERFORMANCE
The authenticated encryption algorithm is expected to have a reasonable running speed in practice. Most chaos-based cryptosystems show poor efficiency due to the time-consuming (13)- (16), as functions of the number of iterations t with the SCML. When t ≥ 16, the test results satisfy Eq. (17), which indicates that the AE tag satisfies the strict avalanche criterion. nature of chaotic iteration. However, the proposed scheme has better efficiency because it benefits from the novel cryptosystem component.
The cycles per byte (CPB) is introduced to compare various chaotic cryptosystems, so that the performances are specified using the same baseline. The smaller the CPB value, the better the computational efficiency of the scheme. As listed in Table 9 , the proposed authenticated encryption algorithm is fast enough to have practical application potential in contrast with the others.
2) HARDWARE SIMULATION
The hardware implementation is simulated with VHDL; the SCML component and entire AE system are tested separately. Table 10 indicates that the proposed hardware implementation requires few logic elements, compared with the classic AES-GCM [25] , which is more adaptive to resource-limited environments.
The throughput comparison is given in Table 11 , which shows that the proposed hardware implementation is more efficient in authenticated encryption than classic AES-GCM2 [25] and Helix [26] . Furthermore, it is comparable in data processing performance with the AES-GCM implementation, which is denoted by AES-GCM1 in Table 11 . The hardware simulation demonstrates that the proposed chaos-based cryptosystem is suitable for application in resource-limited environments.
VI. CONCLUSION
To balance information security in data transmission and the cost of the railway IoT-cloud network, this paper proposed a lightweight authenticated encryption scheme with associated data for the railway environment to provide confidentiality and integrity in one pass. In our scheme, the chaos-based S-Box coupled map lattice, which is used as the keystream generator, shows favorable discrete chaotic characteristics. The security analysis shows that the scheme has a large key space, and is secure against differential, linear, forgery, tampering, and statistical attacks. Moreover, the hardware implementation of the proposed AE system is simulated to test its adaptability to a resource-limited embedded environment, that is the production costs are low, and the S-Box can be easily adapted for the balance of efficiency and security requirements. The performance simulation indicates that the proposed scheme would provide both confidentiality and integrity simultaneously with adequate efficiency in the railway IoT-cloud environment. 
